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PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE 
NEW MARSY’S LAW FOR FLORIDA 
PAUL G. CASSELL & MARGARET GARVIN* 
A majority of states have adopted state constitutional amendments 
protecting crime victims’ rights.  Most of those amendments were adopted 
long ago and many fail to comprehensively address crime victims’ interests.  
In response to these shortcomings, the nation is seeing a new wave of state 
constitutional amendments protecting crime victims’ rights. Among these 
states is Florida, where in November 2018 Florida voters approved 
significantly expanded protections for crime victims in Florida’s 
Constitution—“Marsy’s Law for Florida.” 
This Article explains in detail how Marsy’s Law for Florida provides 
important new protections for crime victims in the Florida criminal justice 
process.  The Article begins by providing a brief overview of the crime 
victims’ rights movement in this country.  It then turns to the specific crime 
victims’ rights added by the new Florida Amendment, describing why each 
of these rights is an important addition to Florida’s Constitution (and other 
similar constitutional amendments in other states). The Article concludes by 
reviewing broader lessons to be learned from Florida’s new enactment, 
contending that Florida’s recent experience may be useful for other states 
considering expanding their state constitutional protections and may 
ultimately set the stage for a federal constitutional debate about protecting 
crime victims’ rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most states now recognize that crime victims have compelling interests 
at stake in criminal justice proceedings—interests so significant that they are 
protected in state constitutional amendments.  But many of those state 
victims’ rights amendments were adopted more than three decades ago and, 
in some respects, are beginning to show their age.1  Many of these 
amendments contain only a short list of victims’ rights and lack effective 
enforcement mechanisms.2  As a result of these defects, most amendments 
 
 1 See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted 
Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135 (2007) (arguing that existing victims’ rights 
provisions that lack victim standing, remedy, and review are flawed and calling for a third 
wave of victims’ rights). 
 2 Arizona is a notable standout. Passed in 1990, the Arizona victims’ rights amendment, 
together with its statutory implementation, has resulted in robust enforcement of victims’ 
rights. See AZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1. 
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fall short of their goal of ensuring that victims’ interests are adequately 
protected throughout the criminal justice system. 
To address these concerns, a new wave of victims’ rights amendments 
has been enacted over roughly the last decade, expanding the rights promised 
to victims and ensuring that those rights can be enforced, even by the victims.  
These new amendments draw on lessons learned over the last several decades 
regarding the scope, structure, and articulation of rights necessary to make 
crime victims’ rights meaningful.  Oregon modified its constitution in 2008 
to remove express hurdles to rights enforcement.3  That same year, California 
adopted the first Marsy’s Law.  Since then, similar Marsy’s Law amendments 
were added to the state constitutions of Illinois in 2014,4 North Dakota and 
South Dakota in 2016,5 Ohio in 2017,6 and Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North 
Carolina, and Oklahoma in November 2018.7 
While these amendments have significant import for criminal cases, 
they have largely escaped serious scholarly attention.  In this Article, we 
attempt to shed light on how these new amendments operate, focusing 
specifically on the recently adopted amendment in our nation’s third most 
populous state, Florida.  Florida approved one of the nation’s first victims’ 
rights amendments in 1988.8  Drawing on what has been learned in the three 
decades since then, new provisions—known as “Marsy’s Law for Florida”—
were drafted by Florida’s Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC) in 
early 2018 and approved by Florida’s voters in November 2018.9 
This Article provides one of the first academic assessments of a Marsy’s 
Law amendment, using Marsy’s Law for Florida as the springboard for 
discussion.  Our analysis proceeds in several steps.  Part I describes the 
history of crime victims’ rights, tracing victims’ involvement in the criminal 
justice process from the earliest days of the nation through today.  Of 
particular importance are recent steps over the last several decades to add 
victim participatory rights into state constitutions.  Florida has been in the 
 
 3 OR CONST. art I, §§ 42, 43. 
 4 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1. 
 5 N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29. 
 6 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a). 
 7 FLA CONST. art I, § 16(b); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XXX; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 37; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34. An iteration of Marsy’s Law was adopted by 
Montana in 2016, but was held to violate the state constitutional separate-vote requirement. 
Montana Ass’n of Cnts. v. State, 404 P.3d 733, 748 (Mont. 2017). Similarly, Kentucky voters 
approved a Marsy’s Law in 2018, but the vote was later held to be invalid because the entire 
text of the amendment was not on the ballot. Westerfield v. Ward, No. 2018-SC-000583-TG, 
2019 WL 2463046, at *10 (Ky. June 13, 2019). 
 8 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988). 
 9 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 2018). 
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vanguard of that effort, with both its original amendment and recent 
revisions. 
Part II then turns to specific rights found in the new Florida provisions.  
Florida now has constitutional protections not only for victims’ rights to 
notice of court hearings, to be present at those hearings, and to be heard, but 
also to a range of other protections such as preventing unreasonable delay in 
the process and providing reasonable protection from defendants, as well 
protection of victims’ privacy and dignity and a right to due process.  Florida 
also added important new enforcement mechanisms for its victims’ rights 
amendment and language to make it entirely self-executing.  These additions 
draw upon a core set of values that have emerged around the country. 
Part III concludes by examining some of the lessons from Florida’s new 
and strengthened state constitutional amendment.  Four lessons are evident.  
First, victims’ rights can be constitutionally protected without harming the 
criminal justice process or violating defendants’ rights.  Second, a consensus 
is emerging around the country regarding the kind of rights to which crime 
victims are entitled.  Third, victims should have “standing” to assert and seek 
enforcement of the rights that they are promised.  Finally, Florida’s broad 
protections for such things as a victim’s right to “due process” could serve to 
significantly expand the protections crime victims’ interests receive 
throughout the criminal justice process and, more broadly, to invigorate a 
constitutional dialogue in this country about protecting crime victims’ rights 
in the federal constitution. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
To understand state crime victims’ rights amendments in general—and 
Florida’s new amendment in particular—it is useful to first understand some 
history about the crime victims’ rights movement and state constitutional 
protections for victims.  This section briefly describes how state amendments 
came to be enacted in many states and then turns specifically to Florida’s 
new amendment. 
A. RECOGNIZING CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
While a comprehensive history of crime victims’ rights in the criminal 
justice process remains to be written, the broad outlines can be quickly 
sketched.  At our country’s founding, crime victims played an important role 
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in criminal prosecutions, often bringing their own “private” prosecutions.10  
Over time, for reasons not fully understood, a system of public prosecution 
steadily displaced the victims’ former role.11  Public prosecutors gradually 
assumed full control over prosecution decisions and any separate interest of 
victims came to lack legal weight.  Ultimately, well into the twentieth 
century, the system evolved to the point where the victim was “the forgotten 
[person] of the system.”12 
The Crime Victims’ Rights Movement developed in the 1970s in 
response to this displacement of victims.  The victim’s absence from criminal 
processes conflicted with “a public sense of justice keen enough that it [] 
found voice in a nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement.”13  Victims’ 
advocates—who hailed from diverse movements, including those concerned 
with women’s rights, civil rights, and “law and order”—urged the adoption 
of reforms giving more attention to victims’ concerns, including protecting 
victims’ rights to be notified of court hearings, to attend those hearings, and 
to be heard at appropriate points in the process.14  Similar developments also 
occurred internationally.15 
 
 10 See, e.g., William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal 
Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976) (describing colonial 
American landscape in which individual victims themselves primarily conducted key roles in 
the administration of justice including arrest, investigation, filing of charges, and prosecution). 
 11 See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2015); Beloof, supra 
note 1, at 1138–42; Abraham Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal 
Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 1 (1982). 
 12 McDonald, supra note 10, at 650. 
 13 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal 
quotations omitted). See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 3–44 (4th ed. 2018); Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: 
The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999); Collene Campbell et al., 
Statement from the Author, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 379 (2012); Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH 
L. REV. 1373 (1994) [hereinafter Cassell, Balancing the Scales]; Goldstein, supra note 11; 
William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative 
Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996).  
 14 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 
UTAH L. REV. 517, 543–47 (1985). See generally BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 31–36; 
Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 
BYU L. REV. 255 (2005); Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 13, at 1380–82. 
 15 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIXED RESULTS: U.S. POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS ON THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF VICTIMS OF CRIME 3–8 (2008), https://www.
hrw.org/report/2008/09/23/mixed-results/us-policy-and-international-standards-rights-and-in
terests-victims [https://perma.cc/8HFD-A8FY] (discussing the many “international human 
rights instruments [that] address or touch on [crime] victims’ rights”); cf. Michael K. Browne, 
International Victims’ Rights Law What Can Be Gleaned from the Victims’ Empowerment 
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The victims’ rights movement received considerable impetus in 1982 
when the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime reviewed the treatment 
of victims.16  In a report issued that year, the task force concluded that the 
criminal justice system “has lost an essential balance. . . . [T]he system has 
deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its protection. . . . The 
victims of crime have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened 
by a system designed to protect them.  This oppression must be redressed.”17  
The Task Force advocated multiple reforms, such as putting the 
responsibility on prosecutors to keep victims notified of all court proceedings 
and bringing to the court’s attention the victim’s view on subjects like bail, 
plea bargains, sentences and restitution.18  The Task Force also urged that 
courts should receive victim-impact evidence at sentencing, order restitution, 
and allow victims and their families to attend trials even if they would be 
called as witnesses.19  In its most sweeping recommendation, the Task Force 
proposed a federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims’ rights 
“to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”20 
Realizing the difficulty of achieving the consensus required to amend 
the United States Constitution, advocates for crime victims’ rights turned 
their efforts to state victims’ rights amendments.  The enactment of these 
state constitutional amendments began with California in 1982,21 followed 
by Rhode Island’s in 1986.22  Florida’s amendment was one of the first in the 
nation and was approved in the next election cycle in 1988.23  The Florida 
provision adopted was extremely brief, simply providing that: 
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide 
victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when 
 
Procedures in Germany as the United States Prepares to Consider the Adoption of a “Victim’s 
Rights Amendment” to its Constitution, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 15 (2004) (discussing German 
victims’ law); Marie Manikis, Imagining the Future of Victims’ Rights in Canada: A 
Comparative Perspective, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 (2015) (examining the evolution of 
Canadian victims’ rights laws). 
 16 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE], https://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/ZD25-CU9U]. 
 17 Id. at 114. 
 18 Id. at 63. 
 19 Id. at 72–73. 
 20 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted). 
 21 CA. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
 22 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 23 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988). 
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relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do 
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.24 
In the ensuing two decades, victims’ rights advocates had considerable 
success with this “states first” strategy,25 with about thirty-five states 
adopting victims’ rights amendments to their state constitutions, protecting a 
wide range of victims’ rights.26  In addition to these state constitutional 
amendments, all fifty states passed statutory victims’ rights.27 
B. FLORIDA’S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CRIME 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
How well did the “first wave” of state constitutional enactments succeed 
in securing the legal protection of victims’ interests in criminal justice? While 
the amendments helped increase recognition of victims in criminal justice 
processes, their effects fell short of full protection for victims’ independent 
interests.  Many of the amendments (such as Florida’s) contained only a short 
list of victims’ rights.28  Many amendments also lacked effective enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that victims’ rights were fully implemented.29 
Victims’ rights advocates have been concerned that such enactments 
“frequently fail to provide meaningful protection whenever they come into 
conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, [or] sheer inertia.”30  
As the U.S. Justice Department reported in 1997: 
[E]fforts to secure victims’ rights . . . have proved less than fully adequate. Victims[’] 
rights advocates have sought reforms at the State level for the past 20 years and many 
States have responded with State statutes and constitutional provisions that seek to 
guarantee victims’ rights. However, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard victims’ 
rights. These significant State efforts simply are not sufficiently consistent, 
comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard victims’ rights.31 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 See S. REP. NO. 108–191, at 3 (2003). 
 26 See Paul G. Cassell, Introduction: The Maturing Victims’ Rights Movement, 13 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2015). 
 27 See Beloof, supra note 14, at 257–58. 
 28 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16A; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 16(b); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; WA. CONST. art. I, § 35. 
 29 See, e.g., Beloof, supra note 14, at 256–60, 300–23 (discussing state amendments 
without clear and specific enforcement provisions). 
 30 Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, 
L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5. 
 31 A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S.J. 
Res. 6 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) (statement of Janet Reno, 
U.S. Att’y Gen.). 
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While more recent assessments are infrequent, they generally conclude 
that victims’ rights “enforcement is wildly uneven.”32 
The failure to consistently enforce state victims’ rights has similarly 
held true for federal victims’ rights.  Consider, for example, one of the 
seemingly simplest rights to provide: the right to notice of court hearings.  In 
the federal system, despite the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) extending 
to crime victims a specific right to notice33 (and the availability of significant 
federal resources to implement that right), many federal crime victims 
continue to be unaware of their rights.  A 2008 General Accounting Office 
report found that approximately 25% of the responding federal crime victims 
were unaware of their right to notice of court hearings.34  Even higher 
percentages of uninformed victims were found in a survey of state criminal 
justice systems.35  Compounding the problem, the same survey of state 
victims found that racial minorities were less likely to be notified than their 
white counterparts.36 
In 2017, Jay Howell, a prominent Florida victims’ attorney with 
significant experience representing victims throughout the state, testified 
before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission about these 
difficulties in enforcing victims’ rights in Florida:  
The issue is enforcement. Under our current system, with our broadly stated 
constitutional amendment and our statutes, are victims seeing those rights unfold in 
their cases? And, the sad reality is that they are not. We don’t have, despite almost 
thirty years under our constitutional amendment and our statutes, a comprehensive, 
consistent or authoritative system for enforcing the rights in practice . . . .37 
One way of improving enforcement of state crime victims’ rights 
enactments is by strengthening state constitutional protections.  A second 
wave of state constitutional efforts began in 2008.  Oregon adopted 
amendments to Article 1, Sections 42 and 43 to enhance enforceability and 
 
 32 BIBAS, supra note 11, at 90. 
 33 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2019). 
 34 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-54, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT: 
INCREASING AWARENESS, MODIFYING THE COMPLAINT PROCESS, AND ENHANCING 
COMPLIANCE MONITORING WILL IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT 82 (2008). 
 35 National Victim Center, Comparison of White and Non-White Crime Victim Responses 
Regarding Victims’ Rights, in VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 701–03 (4th 
ed. 2018). 
 36 Id. at 703. 
 37 Constitution Revision Commission Declaration of Rights Committee, December 12, 
2017 (statement of Jay Howell, made at 1:14:00), https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/12-12-
17-constitution-revision-commission-declaration-rights-committee/. [https://perma.cc/F7P3-
AGMW] 
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California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9—Marsy’s Law, 
for California.38 Since then, similar Marsy’s Law amendments were added to 
the state constitutions of Illinois in 2014,39 North Dakota40 and South Dakota 
in 2016,41 Ohio in 2017,42 and (along with Florida) Georgia,43 Nevada,44 
North Carolina,45 and Oklahoma46 in November 2018. 
The provisions in the recently enacted victims’ rights amendments are 
more comprehensive than the Florida provision adopted nearly thirty years 
ago.  Typically, these newer amendments contain fifteen or more specific 
rights for crime victims, along with detailed provisions concerning the 
enforcement of rights and a definition of the “victims” who can avail 
themselves of the rights.47  The combination of a robust set of rights and 
explicit standing and enforcement provisions is the common thread in this 
new wave of state-constitutional amendments known as “Marsy’s Laws.” 
The recently adopted Marsy’s Law for Florida follows the path of these 
other recent state-level constitutional amendments.  Florida’s constitution is 
one of the most amendable in the country,48 and the amendment moved 
through Florida’s unique mechanism for evaluating changes to the Florida 
Constitution: the Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC).49  Florida’s 
CRC dates to 1968, when Florida’s voters ratified three separate 
constitutional amendments—including one requiring a Constitutional 
Revision Commission to convene and examine the Florida Constitution once 
 
 38 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. The namesake for the California enactment is Marsy Nicholas, 
who was the sister of Dr. Henry Nicholas, the co-founder of Broadcom Corporation. In 1983, 
Marsy was stalked and murdered in California by her ex-boyfriend. Marsy’s Law, in its 
California iteration and elsewhere, attempts to prevent recurrence of the poor treatment the 
Nicholas family received during the criminal justice process by affording to victims a robust 
set of rights, as well as explicit mechanisms to assert and seek enforcement of those rights. 
 39 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1. 
 40 N.D. CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 41 S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29. 
 42 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a). 
 43 GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ XXX. 
 44 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 45 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37. 
 46 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34. 
 47 See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 2; 25S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29. 
 48 TALBOT D’ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 11–
13 (1991). 
 49 See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth 
Its Popular Sovereignty Price, 52 FLA. L. REV. 249 (2000) (describing the Constitution 
Revision Commission’s suggested changes to the Florida Constitution). 
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every twenty years, beginning in 1977.50  A CRC met in 1977–78, 1997–98, 
and, most recently, 2017–18.51 
On November 7, 2017, five members of the CRC filed the Marsy’s Law 
for Florida proposal.52  On January 19, 2018, following a hearing before the 
Declaration of Rights Subcommittee, the proposal was approved by a 6-1 
vote.53  The CRC held further hearings on the proposal around the State and, 
on April 18, 2018, the full CRC approved the proposal and sent it to the voters 
for their consideration.54 
On November 6, 2018, the necessary supermajority of Florida voters 
approved the amendment, with 61.6% of Florida voters voting to pass the 
measure.55 
II. SPECIFIC RIGHTS IN FLORIDA’S NEW VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
Crime victims in Florida now have a more comprehensive and 
enforceable set of state constitutional rights.56  But some critics of these new 
state constitutional protections have raised concerns, suggesting (often 
without any specific support) that protections for criminal defendants will be 
eroded or other unintended problems may emerge.57  Other critics take the 
opposite tack, arguing that these measures are mere “feel good” gestures that 
will make no substantive difference for crime victims.58 
We believe both of these objections are misplaced.  In this part of this 
Article, we respond to these concerns, using Florida’s language as a 
springboard.  Careful analysis of Florida’s new provisions, as well as parallel 
 
 50 See CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 2017-2018, HISTORY (2018), https://flcrc.
gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/ESZ6-FHSW] (archived website that describes the history 
of Florida’s Constitutional Review Commission). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 2017-2018, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS: 
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AND OF VICTIMS; ADDITIONAL RIGHTS OF VICTIMS (2018), https://flcrc.
gov/Proposals/Commissioner/2017/0096 [https://perma.cc/4JTZ-SYJQ]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n Meeting, April 16, 2018 Session, vol. I, at 
131 (Apr. 16, 2018) https://crc.law.fsu.edu/publishedcontent/administrativepublications/meet
ings/transcripts/transcript04-16-2018vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW32-BV66]. 
 55 See Florida Division of Elections, Rights of Crime Victims, (Nov. 6, 2018), https://flori
daelectionwatch.gov/Amendments [https://perma.cc/HX2R-8TY7] (maintained by the Fla. 
Dep’t of State). 
 56 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1)(a). 
 57 See, e.g., Andrew Pantazi, Will Marsy’s Law Help Victims or Create New Problems?, 
JACKSONVILLE FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 28, 2018, https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180
928/will-marsys-law-help-victims-or-create-new-problems [https://perma.cc/A2RR-F3TS]. 
 58 Id. 
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language found in other state constitutions, shows that victims’ rights do not 
harm the administration of criminal justice or violate defendants’ rights.  In 
the sections that follow, we trace the source of Florida’s extensive list of 
victims’ rights.  We describe and analyze the most significant rights provided 
in the new Florida Amendment, explaining how each of these rights would 
operate against the backdrop of other similar provisions that exist around the 
country.59  We also look at provisions defining who is a crime “victim” 
entitled to rights as well as the enforcement mechanisms available to victims 
to assert their rights.  This review demonstrates that the new Florida 
Amendment is a measure that properly draws on an emerging consensus 
around the country on how state constitutional victims’ rights amendments 
should be drafted. 
A. THE RIGHT TO NOTICE OF CASE PROCEEDINGS 
A crime victim’s right to notice of criminal proceedings is an important 
right that is now broadly recognized.  Because victims and their families are 
directly and often irreparably harmed by crime, they have a vital interest in 
knowing about any subsequent prosecution and any associated proceedings.  
Notice of proceedings is traditionally recognized as a core part of due 
process.60  Knowing what is happening cannot only greatly reduce a victim’s 
anxiety about the process,61 but it can allow them to take necessary safety 
measures and prepare for subsequent aspects of the case when they may have 
more participatory rights at stake.  For these reasons, the President’s Task 
Force on Victims of Crime urged that “[p]rosecutors should keep victims 
informed about the status of the case from the initial decision to charge or to 
decline prosecution.”62 
Building on this recommendation, the Marsy’s Law for Florida 
Amendment provides that a victim will receive notice of case proceedings.  
Specifically, the proposal extends to victims, “upon request,” the right to 
“reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of . . . all public proceedings 
involving the criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, trial, plea, 
sentencing, or adjudication . . . .”63 This provision is similar to those found 
in many other states’ constitutional and statutory provisions, which promise 
 
 59 In this brief article, we do not discuss every right that might be considered fundamental 
or important to victims. 
 60 See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). 
 61 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 64 (quoting victim to this effect). 
 62 Id. 
 63 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(a). The new amendment extends to victims a specific right 
to “due process,” as discussed infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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crime victims that they will be notified about criminal justice events related 
to the crimes committed against them.64  The California Constitution, for 
example, guarantees crime victims “reasonable notice” of all public 
proceedings.65  And the Texas Constitution promises “the right to notification 
of court proceedings” on the “request of a crime victim.”66 
The new notice provision in the Florida Amendment mirrors these 
constitutional rights in other states and extends an unqualified right to 
“reasonable notice” of all public court proceedings to Florida’s crime 
victims.  The provision expands on the earlier version, which provided a right 
to notice only for “all crucial stages of criminal proceedings,”67 a phrase that 
was not precisely defined and in its ambiguity did not provide clear 
protections for victims.  The new Florida notice provision provides 
constitutional foundation for victim notification, ensuring that the existing 
state statutory scheme directing state agencies to provide “guidelines” for 
notification cannot undercut the notification to victims.68 
Fortunately, with emerging electronic technologies, keeping victims 
informed about court hearings is becoming easier.69  Automated victim-
notification systems abound; most prominently used in many states is the so-
called VINE (Victim Information Notification Everyday) system.70  Under 
such a system, a victim registers for notification through e-mail or phone call.  
Then, when court hearings are scheduled, a computerized notification is 
made. 
In some cases (for example, terrorist bombings or massive financial 
fraud), the large number of victims may render individual notifications 
impractical.  In such circumstances, notice by means of a press release to 
 
 64 Notice and other rights provisions across the country vary with regard to inclusion of 
the “upon request” language. Notably, even when a right includes opt-in language such as 
“upon request” there are system obligations to ensure the right has meaning. See, e.g., Ariz. 
ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 875 P.2d 824, 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) 
(determining in the context of parole that the state may not use a victim’s failure to request 
notice as an excuse for denying rights when the state failed to use reasonable efforts to inform 
the victim she was constitutional entitled to request notice). 
 65 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(7). 
 66 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(2)(b)(1). 
 67 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (1988). 
 68 See FLA. STAT. § 960.001 (providing “guidelines” for fair treatment of victims and 
witnesses in the criminal justice and juvenile justice systems). 
 69 See BIBAS, supra note 11, at 150 (“With the advent of email, notifying victims . . . is 
even easier.”). 
 70 See, e.g., VINE, APPRISS SAFETY (2020), https://apprisssafety.com/solutions/vine/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HAK-RLBE]. 
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daily newspapers in the area has been regarded as a reasonable alternative to 
actual notice sent to each victim at his/her/their residential address.71  New 
technologies may also provide a way of affording reasonable notice, with 
more direct notification.  For example, some federal courts have approved 
notice by publication, where the publication directs crime victims to a 
website maintained by the government with hyperlinks to updates on cases.72  
The Florida notice provision comfortably embraces such possibilities by 
requiring that victims receive “reasonable” notice of court proceedings. 
B. THE RIGHT TO ATTEND COURT HEARINGS 
The new Florida Amendment also guarantees crime victims, “upon 
request,” an unqualified right “to be present at all public proceedings 
involving the criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, trial, plea, 
sentencing, or adjudication, even if the victim will be a witness at the 
proceeding, notwithstanding any rule to the contrary.”73  This right builds on 
a reascendant national consensus that victims deserve the right to attend all 
proceedings related to their case.74 
In 1982, the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime articulated the 
rationale and need for a right to attend criminal trials:  
The crime is often one of the most significant events in the lives of victims and their 
families. They, no less than the defendant, have a legitimate interest in the fair 
adjudication of the case, and should therefore, as an exception to the general rule 
providing for the exclusion of witnesses, be permitted to be present for the entire trial.75  
Several strong reasons support such a right.  As Professor Doug Beloof 
and one of this Article’s authors have argued at length,76 the right to attend 
the trial may be critical in allowing the victim to recover from the 
psychological damage of a crime.  It is widely recognized that the “victim’s 
 
 71 United States v. Peralta, No. 3:08-cr-233, 2009 WL 2998050, at *1–2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 
15, 2009). 
 72 See, e.g., United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025-SS, 2009 WL 806757, at *1–2 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 26, 2009); United States v. Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641 (NGG), 2007 WL 4232985, 
at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); United States v. Croteau, No. 05-CR-30104-DRH, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23684, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2006). 
 73 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(7)(a). 
 74 See Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim’s Right to Attend the Trial: 
The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 504–14 (2005). 
 75 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at 80. 
 76 See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74. 
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presence during the trial may also facilitate healing of the debilitating 
psychological wounds suffered by a crime victim.”77 
Moreover, without a right to attend the trial, “the criminal justice system 
merely intensifies the loss of control that victims feel after the crime.”78  It 
should come as no surprise that “[v]ictims are often appalled to learn that 
they may not be allowed to sit in the courtroom during hearings or the trial.  
They are unable to understand why they cannot simply observe the 
proceedings in a supposedly public forum.”79  One crime victim put it more 
directly: “All we ask is that we be treated just like a criminal.”80  Defendants 
take full advantage of their right to be in the courtroom.81 
To ensure that victims can attend court proceedings, many state 
amendments extend to a crime victim an unqualified right to attend the trial,82 
while others extend only a qualified right to attend, limiting the right if the 
victim’s testimony would be materially affected by attendance.83  The 1988 
Florida Victims’ Right Amendment only extended to Florida victims a 
qualified right to attend court hearings—specifically, a right to be present “to 
the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of 
the accused.”84  This qualifying phrase is ambiguous, because it is unclear 
 
 77 Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crime/Victims of Justice, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 41 (1987). 
 78 Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 72 (1987). 
 79 Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims’ 
Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 51, 58 (1987). 
 80 Id. at 59 (quoting Edmund Newton, Criminals Have All the Rights, LADIES’ HOME J., 
Sept. 1986). 
 81 See LINDA E. LEDRAY, RECOVERING FROM RAPE 199 (2d ed. 1994) (“Even the most 
disheveled [rapist] will turn up in court clean-shaven, with a haircut, and often wearing a suit 
and tie. He will not appear to be the type of man who could rape.”). 
 82 See, e.g., AK. CONST. art. I, § 24 (right “to be present at all criminal . . . proceedings 
where the accused has the right to be present”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (right “to attend 
the trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to attend”); OR. R. EVID. 615 
(witness exclusion rule does not apply to “victim in a criminal case”); see also Beloof & 
Cassell, supra note 74, at 504–19 (providing a comprehensive discussion of state law on this 
subject). 
 83 See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28(1) (victim has “the right to be present at trial unless 
the trial court finds sequestration necessary for a fair trial for the defendant”). 
 84 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988) (“Victims of crime or their lawful 
representatives . . . are entitled to the right . . . to be present . . . at all crucial stages of criminal 
proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the 
accused”); see also FLA. STAT. § 960.001(1)(e) (“A victim, a victim’s parent or guardian if the 
victim is a minor, a lawful representative of the victim or of the victim’s parent or guardian if 
the victim is a minor, or a victim’s next of kin may not be excluded from any portion of any 
hearing, trial, or proceeding pertaining to the offense based solely on the fact that such person 
is subpoenaed to testify, unless, upon motion, the court determines such person’s presence to 
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how a victim attending a trial could interfere with the rights of the accused.85  
A related implementing statute was similarly unhelpful. It provided that “[i]n 
a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim’s next of kin, the parent 
or guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful representative of such person” 
cannot be sequestered from a trial “unless, upon motion, the court determines 
such person’s presence to be prejudicial.”86  Here again, what is “prejudicial” 
is left undefined. 
The new Florida Amendment resolves such ambiguities by clearly 
establishing an unqualified right for a victim to attend a trial—even where 
the victim might be called as a witness.  Such a provision is constitutional, 
as the relevant case law demonstrates.  While the United States Supreme 
Court has not spoken at any length on witness sequestration rules,87 many 
lower courts have.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit—the federal Court of 
Appeals with jurisdiction over Florida—found no violation of a defendant’s 
constitutional rights when a murdered police officer’s young son attended a 
capital sentencing proceeding.88  The Court could  
see no error, much less a constitutional deprivation, in the trial court’s ruling. Petitioner 
cites no authority for the proposition that due process requires that in a capital 
sentencing proceeding, the defendant has a constitutional right to have removed from 
the courtroom spectators whose presence may remind the jury of the victim. A criminal 
proceeding is a public hearing; all citizens, including the victim’s family, have a right 
to attend.89 
 
be prejudicial.”); FLA. STAT. § 90.616(2)(d) (“A witness may not be excluded if the witness 
is . . . [i]n a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim’s next of kin, the parent or 
guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful representative of such person, unless, upon 
motion, the court determines such person’s presence to be prejudicial.”). 
 85 See generally Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74, at 527–34 (collecting case law on this 
issue). 
 86 FLA. STAT. § 90.616. 
 87 The Supreme Court has indicated that exclusion of a witness who disobeys a 
sequestration order is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, Holder v. United 
States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893), a ruling that hardly suggests constitutional underpinnings for 
sequestration. The Supreme Court has also held that a defendant cannot be sequestered 
because of his right to confront witnesses against him, Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 
(1989), and that sequestration does not permit a trial judge to prevent a defendant from 
communicating with his lawyer during an overnight break. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 
80, 88 (1976). 
 88 Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1523 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 89 Id. at 1523; see also United States v. Edwards, 526 F.3d 747, 758 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that “[a] criminal defendant has no constitutional right to exclude witnesses from the 
courtroom”); State v. Williams, 960 A.2d 805, 815 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (finding 
that “defendant had no constitutional right to exclude [victim] from the courtroom while 
[victim] had a constitutional right to remain after concluding his testimony”). 
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Other courts have explained that the issue of witness sequestration 
simply presents no federal constitutional question.  The reasons were well-
stated by Judge Posner, who explained that the Constitution does not embody 
every procedural device that might protect a defendant: “A refusal to 
exclude . . . witnesses until they testify is not a denial of due process . . . . 
[T]he due process clause does not incorporate every refinement of legal 
procedure designed to make trials fairer or more accurate—not even one 
hallowed by time.”90  Following this same analysis, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals has rejected a constitutional attack on Maryland’s victims’ 
attendance provision, holding: 
Nothing in the constitution touches on the exclusion of witnesses during criminal trials. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 10 of 
our own guarantee to an accused a speedy and public trial and to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him. Otherwise neither document contains anything that might be 
seen as a right to limit those who may want to attend the trial.91 
Based on such well-developed case law,92 the unqualified right to attend 
the entire trial that Florida’s amendment provides victims is constitutional.93  
And Florida’s victims are now unequivocally guaranteed the ability to attend 
all other public proceedings involving the crimes committed against them. 
C. THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS 
In addition to creating an unqualified right for victims to attend an 
offender’s trial, Florida’s new amendment also grants victims the right to be 
heard at various points throughout the criminal justice process.  Specifically, 
the amendment enumerates victims’ right to be heard, “upon request,” in 
“public proceeding[s] involving pretrial or other release from any form of 
legal constraint, plea, sentencing, adjudication, or parole” and, more 
 
 90 Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also State 
v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a victim’s right to attend 
and remain in the courtroom during the entire trial of a defendant did not facially, or as applied, 
violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial). 
 91 Wheeler v. State, 596 A.2d 78, 88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
 92 See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74, at 527–29 (collecting cases rejecting defendant’s 
arguments that victim/witness exclusion is constitutionally required). 
 93 Martinez v. State, 664 So.2d 1034, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), suggested, in what 
seems to have been dicta, that a defendant had some sort of right to exclude a victim from 
opening statements in trial. In light of the authorities collected above, none of which appear 
to have been considered by Martinez, the dicta in the case should not be regarded as 
persuasive. See also Beloof & Cassell, supra note 74, at 533–34 (arguing Martinez is 
“singularly unpersuasive”). 
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generally, in “any proceeding during which a right of the victim is 
implicated.”94 
This new version of the right to be heard expands the former right-to-
be-heard provision.  The previous version limited the right to be heard to 
unspecified “crucial stages” of criminal cases.95  In contrast, Florida’s new, 
expanded right-to-be-heard provision specifically enumerates various stages 
of a criminal proceeding where a victim is guaranteed the right to be heard, 
and adds a final catch-all for any other proceeding where a victim’s right 
might be implicated. 
This expansion follows the trend in many other states.  Many states now 
recognize that crime victims deserve the right to be heard at numerous points 
in the criminal justice process, thus allowing victims to participate directly 
in the administration of criminal justice.96  Direct victim participation can 
provide important information to judges.  For example, allowing an 
individual victim to speak at sentencing is useful because “gauging the harm 
to a unique human being, not a faceless abstraction, requires evidence of how 
that particular victim suffered.”97  Victim participation can also lead to 
important therapeutic benefits for victims and legitimizing benefits for the 
system.  As then-Professor (now-Judge) Stephanos Bibas has explained at 
length in The Machinery of Criminal Justice, “it is simple participation that 
helps to empower and heal victims.  Participants see the law as more fair and 
more legitimate when they have some control over the process and [] they 
have been heard, whether or not they control ultimate outcomes.”98 
Recognizing such benefits, many states have extended a right to victims 
to participate directly in some criminal justice proceedings.  For example, the 
recently enacted constitutional provision in South Dakota promises crime 
victims “[t]he right to be heard in any proceeding involving release, plea, 
sentencing, adjudication, disposition or parole, and any proceeding during 
which a right of the victim is implicated.”99  Other states have similar 
 
 94 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b). 
 95 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (amended 1988). 
 96 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(b)(8) (providing victims the right “[t]o be heard, upon 
request, at any proceeding, including any delinquency proceeding, involving a post-arrest 
release decision, plea, sentencing, post-conviction release decision, or any proceeding in 
which a right of the victim is at issue”). 
 97 BIBAS, supra note 11, at 91; see also Laurence H. Tribe, McVeigh’s Victims Had a Right 
to Speak, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1997, at A25. 
 98 BIBAS, supra note 11, at 151. 
 99 S.D. CONST. art VI, § 29. 
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provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing victims the opportunity to 
participate.100 
Like other states, the Florida Amendment identifies specific stages at 
which a victim has the right to be heard.  The first is the right to be heard “in 
any public proceeding involving pretrial or other release from any form of 
legal constraint . . . .”101 This broad provision covers any decision to release 
a defendant on bail or other form of pre-trial release.102  This right ensures 
that a victim can address the court directly regarding whether a judge should 
release a defendant before trial.  The victim is not given the ability to 
command or veto the release or detention of any defendant; the ultimate 
decision remains with the judge.  Similarly, when considering later release 
such as parole, a victim statement “can enable the board to appreciate fully 
the nature of the offense and the degree to which the particular inmate may 
[present risks to the victim or community] upon release.”103  The board, of 
course, makes the final parole decision. 
The new Florida Amendment also extends to victims a right to be heard 
regarding any “plea,”104 consistent with provisions in many other states.105  A 
 
 100 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art II, § 2.1(A)(4) (right to be heard at proceedings involving 
post-arrest release, negotiated pleas, and sentencing); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (right to be 
heard at critical stages); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(5) (right to make statement at sentencing); 
KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 15(a) (right to be heard at sentencing or any other appropriate time); 
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (right to make statement at sentencing); MO. CONST. art. I, 
§ 32(1)–(2) (right to be heard at guilty pleas, bail hearings, sentencings, probation revocation 
hearings, and parole hearings, unless interests of justice require otherwise); N.M. CONST. art. 
II, § 24(A)(7) (right to make statement at sentencing and post-sentencing hearings); R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 23 (right to address court at sentencing); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (right 
to be heard at important proceedings); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (right to make statement at 
sentencing or release proceeding); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (opportunity to make statement to 
court at disposition). 
 101 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b). 
 102 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b) (setting out possible conditions of pre-trial release); FLA. 
STAT. § 903.046(2) (setting out bail determination criteria); see also Byrd v. Mascara, 197 
So.3d 1211, 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing circumstances in which bail might be 
excessive). See generally SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A 
COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018). 
 103 Frances P. Bernat et al., Victim Impact Laws and the Parole Process in the United 
States: Balancing Victim and Inmate Rights and Interests, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 121, 
134 (1994). See generally Laura L. Richardson, The Impact of Marsy’s Law on Parole in 
California, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1091 (2013) (discussing changes in parole hearings after 
Marsy’s law enactment); Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights: 
Implementation, Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431 (2016) (discussing victim 
participation in parole hearings). 
 104 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b). 
 105 See BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 419–21. 
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victim’s right to be heard concerning a plea is important, because under 
Florida’s current rules of procedure, the judge is not bound to approve a plea 
agreement negotiated by the parties.106  This is consistent with the rule in 
most states that a plea bargain between the prosecution and a defendant must 
be submitted to the trial judge for approval.107  If the judge believes that the 
bargain is not in the interests of justice, she may reject it.108  Unfortunately 
in some states, a victim does not always have the opportunity to discuss a 
plea with the prosecution while it is being negotiated109 or to present to the 
judge information about whether the plea is in the interests of justice.  Yet 
there are compelling reasons to afford victims a role in the plea-bargaining 
process: 
The victim’s interests in participating in the plea bargaining process are many. The fact 
that they are consulted and listened to provide them with respect and an 
acknowledgment that they are the harmed individual. This in turn may contribute to the 
psychological healing of the victim. The victim may have financial interests in the form 
of restitution or compensatory fine. . . . [B]ecause judges act in the public interest when 
they decide to accept or reject a plea bargain, the victim is an additional source of 
information for the court.110 
The Florida Amendment not only gives victims a right to be heard 
before a judge agrees to accept any plea, but also gives victims, upon request, 
a specific right to “confer with the prosecuting attorney concerning any plea 
agreements . . . .”111  Similar rights are found in other state constitutions and 
 
 106 Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 1996) (the judge “is never bound to honor the 
[plea] agreement”). 
 107 See id. at 419–22 (discussing this issue). 
 108 See, e.g., UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (“The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty . . . .”); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (following Rule 11(e) and 
holding “[n]othing in the statute requires a court to accept a guilty plea . . . ”). 
 109 See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: 
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 377 
(2016) (discussing diversity in practice about victim involvement in plea negotiations). 
 110 BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 423. See generally Elizabeth N. Jones, The Ascending 
Role of Crime Victims in Plea-Bargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 97 (2014) 
(discussing victims’ rights during plea); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: 
From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 330–32 (2007) (victim involvement 
in plea bargains improves perception of fair treatment and increases public confidence in the 
process); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U.L. REV. 301 
(1987) (advancing reasons for victim participation in plea discussions). 
 111 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(c). The provision also extends rights to confer regarding 
“release, restitution, sentencing, or any other disposition of the case.” Id. The principles 
discussed above in text about conferring on plea decisions apply equally to these other 
situations. 
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the federal CVRA.112  A right to confer with the prosecutor gives a crime 
victim the ability to potentially influence the prosecutor’s decision about 
what kind of plea arrangement to offer.  This means that the right to confer 
must be provided “at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those 
rights meaningfully.”113  As with the right to be heard regarding any release, 
victims have a voice in the plea-bargaining process, not a veto or a mandate.  
The judge is not required to follow the victim’s suggested course of action 
regarding the plea, but gains more information on which to base a 
determination on how best to proceed. 
The new Florida Amendment also specifically gives victims a right to 
be heard at “any public proceeding involving . . . sentencing, adjudication, or 
parole . . . .”114  Here again, this provision is consistent with those of many 
other state amendments, which typically extend to victims the right to be 
heard at proceedings for determining a sentence115 or parole.116  Defendants, 
of course, have the right to directly address the sentencing authority before a 
sentence is imposed.117  The Florida provision extends the same basic right 
to victims.118 
The reasons for a victim’s right to be heard at sentencing are manifold, 
including providing information to the sentencing judge, creating therapeutic 
and other benefits for victims, explaining the crime’s harm to the defendant, 
and improving the perceived fairness of sentencing.119  It is important to 
 
 112 See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. I, § 29(10) (giving victims the right “to confer with the 
attorney for the government”); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (“the reasonable right to confer with 
the attorney for the Government in the case”). 
 113 Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (explaining 
important of victim conferral right) (citing United States v. BP Products North America, 2008 
WL 501321 (S.D. Tex. 2008)); see also Opinion and Order, Jane Does v. United States, No. 
9:08-cv-80736-KAM (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2019) (finding that victims of Jeffrey Epstein sex 
trafficking crimes should have been informed before prosecutors entered into a non-
prosecution agreement). 
 114 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1)(b). 
 115 See BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 599–600. 
 116 See id. at 645. 
 117 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 246 So.3d 392, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (discussing 
defendant’s right of allocution); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A) (recognizing defendant’s 
right to allocute in federal cases). 
 118 See generally NORMA DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, 
STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 349–58 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing victim impact statements). See 
also Cozzie v. State, No. SC13-2393, 2017 WL 1954976, at *9 (Fla. May 11, 2017) 
(recognizing that crime victims’ state constitutional right to be heard at crucial stages supports 
the admission of victim impact evidence at sentencing). 
 119 See generally Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 611 (2009). 
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emphasize that victims “are not reflexively punitive” and a number of 
“[e]mpirical studies find that participation by victims does not lead to harsher 
sentences.”120  Nor does the claim that victims’ impact statements might be 
somehow “emotional” carry much weight, given that many other parts of the 
law recognize the propriety of emotional arguments.121 
Victims can exercise their right to be heard in any appropriate fashion, 
including making an oral statement at court proceedings or submitting 
written information for the court’s consideration.122  Defendants can likewise 
respond to the information that victims provide in appropriate ways, such as 
 
 120 Bibas, supra note 11, at 91; see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VICTIM IMPACT 
STATEMENTS: THEIR EFFECTS ON COURT OUTCOMES AND VICTIM SATISFACTION 68 (1990) 
(concluding that the result of the study “lend[s] support to advocates of victim impact 
statements” since no evidence indicates that these statements “put[] defendants in jeopardy 
[or] result in harsher sentences”); EDWIN VILLMOARE & VIRGINIA N. NETO, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, VICTIM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING 
HEARINGS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA VICTIMS’ BILL OF RIGHTS 61 (1987) (“[t]he right to 
allocution at sentencing has had little net effect . . . on sentences in general”); Cassell, supra 
note 119, at 634–37 (“good evidence that victim impact statements generally lead to harsher 
sentences is lacking”); Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact 
Statements on Sentencing Decisions: A Test in an Urban Setting, 11 JUST. Q. 453, 466 (1994) 
(finding “no support for those who argue against [victim impact] statements on the grounds 
that their use places defendants in jeopardy”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim 
Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 306, 308 (2003) (“We find [no] significant relation between the introduction of [victim 
impact evidence] and sentencing outcomes”); Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad 
Victims? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, 
1999 CRIM. L. REV. 545, 548 (1999) (“sentence severity has not increased following the 
passage of [victim impact] legislation”); cf. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, 
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 137 (2004) 
(“Victims do not want vengeance so much as additional rights to participate.”). But cf. Susan 
A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 
166–67 (2012) (arguing that mock jury research shows victim impact evidence leads to 
punitiveness); Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The 
Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 
1050 (2014) (discussing limitations of the current studies and making suggestions for future 
research). 
 121 Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 355, 356 (2008) (“Rather than bemoaning emotional reactions, reformers 
should acknowledge emotion as the legitimate battlefield of criminal justice.”); cf. Paul G. 
Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims Rights Amendment, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 486–96 (victim impact statements convey information, not emotion). 
 122 See Paul G. Cassell & Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The 
American Perspective, 15 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 149, 163–67 (2011) (discussing victims’ rights 
to present impact statements orally and in other ways). 
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providing counter-information.123  To assist victims in making statements 
that may be useful to the sentencing judge, the Florida Amendment gives 
victims the “right to receive a copy of any presentence report, and any other 
report or record relevant to the exercise of a victim’s right, except for such 
portions made confidential or exempt by law.”124  This provision ensures that 
Florida victims will know the salient facts that a judge is considering when 
imposing a sentence, unlike the shot-in-the-dark approach that some other 
jurisdictions follow by not providing victims access to the report.125 
The Florida Amendment also extends a right to be heard to “any 
proceeding during which a right of the victim is implicated.”126  This catch-
all is consistent with language in many other state amendments.127  This 
makes explicit that victims can present information in support of a claim of 
right under the amendments, consistent with ordinary due-process 
principles.128 
Indeed, fortifying the new right to be heard in Florida is based on 
ensuring an overarching and general right to “due process.”129  This right has 
the potential to be a sweeping protection for crime victims in Florida, just as 
the federal Due Process Clause has provided significant protections for 
criminal defendants in criminal justice proceedings throughout the country.  
The exact reach of Florida’s new due process provision will depend on case-
specific development in future years, but it should ensure that victims’ 
interests are broadly considered whenever judges and other actors make 
procedural decisions affecting victims. 
D. THE RIGHT TO PROCEEDINGS FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
DELAY 
Florida’s amendment also guarantees victims the right “to proceedings 
free from unreasonable delay, and to prompt and final conclusion of the case 
 
 123 See generally id. at 175–96 (providing a fifty-state survey on procedures concerning 
victim impact statements). 
 124 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(e). 
 125 See Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, UTAH L. REV. 861, 928–936 (2007) (discussing 
conflicting federal law on whether victims can receive access to the presentence report in 
federal cases). 
 126 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(b). 
 127 See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29(9). 
 128 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (“For more than a century the central 
meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are 
entitled to be heard.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 129 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1). 
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and any related postjudgment proceedings.”130  This provision parallels 
language found in many other state provisions that have extended to crime 
victims the right to “a speedy trial and a prompt and final conclusion of the 
case”131 or to proceedings “free from unreasonable delay.”132  Such 
provisions are designed to be the victim’s analogue to a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial.133  The defendant’s right is designed, 
among other things, “to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public 
accusation” and “to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the 
ability of an accused to defend himself.”134  The interests underlying a speedy 
trial, however, are not confined to defendants.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial 
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the 
accused.”135 
Victims often suffer significantly from delays in the criminal justice 
system.136  A “common problem in the prosecution of crimes against victims 
is that the trial is typically delayed through scheduling conflicts, 
continuances, and other unexpected delays throughout the course of the 
trial.”137  And victims suffer as a consequence of these delays.  For example, 
victims of violent crime frequently suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD).138  A connection between initial victimization and later depression, 
substance abuse, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive-
 
 130 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(10). 
 131 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(10); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(9). 
 132 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(6); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1); MO. CONST. art. 
I, § 32(1)(5); WIS. CONST. art I, § 9m. The right may also exist in statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
§ 960.001(1)(a)(7) (requiring law enforcement to inform victims of “[t]he right of a victim to 
a prompt and timely disposition of the case in order to minimize the period during which the 
victim must endure the responsibilities and stress involved to the extent that this right does not 
interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused”). 
 133 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”). 
 134 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 
116, 120 (1966)). 
 135 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 
 136 See Brief of Arizona Voice for Crime Victims et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 6–9, Ryan v. Washington, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (No. 16-840) (collecting 
research on delays). This section draws on the research collected in the AVCV brief. 
 137 Mary Beth Ricke, Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements, and 
Alternatives to Legislative Protection, 41 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 181, 183 (2013). 
 138 See Dean G. Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims: 
Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 119, 125–26 (2003); Jim Parsons & 
Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. 
TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182 (2010). 
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compulsive disorder, and even suicide have also been reported in the 
academic literature.139  Delays in the criminal process can exacerbate these 
initial injuries.  Multiple studies suggest “the negative effect on a victim’s 
healing process when there is a prolonged trial of the alleged attacker because 
the actual judicial process is a burden on the victim.”140  And “[t]he long 
delay between reporting a crime to the police and the beginning of the trial 
represents [a] source of psychological stress for crime victims.”141 
Academic literature confirms the ways in which delays in the criminal 
justice system can compound the crime’s initial harmful effects on a 
victim.142  A victim’s experience with the justice system often “means the 
difference between a healing experience and one that exacerbates the initial 
trauma.”143  Delays in proceedings can also be particularly difficult for child 
victims, who may have difficulty healing until the anxiety of legal 
proceedings can be brought to an end.144 
The new Florida provisions do not require a judge to follow a victim’s 
call for scheduling trial or for ending all delay; rather, a judge must prevent 
“unreasonable” delay”145 and, ultimately, provide a victim with “a prompt 
and final conclusion of the case.”146  Because of language and intent 
similarities, when interpreting these provisions, Florida courts can look to the 
traditional body of case law that already exists for resolving defendants’ 
speedy-trial claims.147 
 
 139 Parsons & Bergin, supra note 138, at 182. 
 140 Ricke, supra note 137, at 193. 
 141 Ulrich Orth & Andreas Maercker, Do Trials of Perpetrators Retraumatize Victims?, 19 
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 212, 215 (2004). 
 142 Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal 
Intervention, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 159 (2003). 
 143 Parsons & Bergin, supra note 138, at 182; see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 
585 (2006) (“Both the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely 
enforcement of a sentence.”); Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in a Hill of Beans, 
2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 311, 322 (2006). 
 144 Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 13, at 1402–07. 
 145 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 931 (D. Utah 2005) 
(interpreting CVRA’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay to preclude delay in 
sentencing). 
 146 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(10). 
 147 For example, in Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court set forth various 
factors that could be used to evaluate a defendant’s speedy-trial challenge in the wake of a 
delay. 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972) (describing factors such as: (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether and when the defendant asserted his speedy-trial right; 
and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2 (5th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2018). 
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The new Florida provisions also set specific deadlines for the 
scheduling of a trial.  Specifically, the provisions call for a trial judge to hold 
a calendar call within fifteen days of a state attorney’s filing of a demand for 
a speedy trial.148  The provisions then require that the judge schedule a trial 
within sixty days of the conference, unless the court enters an order “with 
specific findings of fact” that justify a later trial date.149 
In addition to creating time requirements that ensure that victims do not 
have to suffer unreasonable delays in scheduling trials, the Florida 
Amendment also creates timeliness requirements for concluding any state-
level appeal and collateral attack on a criminal judgment.  Specifically, the 
amendment requires that any such attacks “must be complete within two 
years from the date of appeal in non-capital cases and within five years from 
the date of appeal in capital cases.”150 
Like trial court timelines, exceptions to these deadlines exist if a court 
“enters an order with specific findings as to why the court was unable to 
comply . . . and the circumstances causing delay.”151  In addition, the 
Amendment requires that on a yearly basis “the chief judge of any district 
court of appeal or the chief justice of the supreme court shall report on a case-
by-case basis to the speaker of the house of representatives and the president 
of the senate all cases where the court entered” such an order “regarding 
inability to comply” with the appellate level deadline.152 
These provisions raise no separation of powers questions.  While the 
Amendment sets out standard timelines for criminal cases—implicitly giving 
priority to their resolution—a Florida court remains free to depart from the 
timelines in a particular case if there is a good, case-specific reason requiring 
a departure.  If there is such a reason, the court must explain its specific 
reasons for departing.  This is consistent with long-standing provisions in the 
federal Speedy Trial Act, which also permit departure from a trial timeline 
(70 days) if the court sets forth “in the record of the case, either orally or in 
writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting 
of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the 
defendant in a speedy trial.”153 
 
 148 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(10)(a). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at § 16(b)(10)(b). 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. at § .§ 16(b)(10)(b). 
 153 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(7)(A) (2008). 
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E. THE RIGHT TO REASONABLE PROTECTION AND OTHER 
SAFETY-RELATED PROVISIONS 
In addition to providing victims with rights that relate to proceedings, 
the Amendment also extends certain protections designed to keep victims 
safe throughout the entire criminal justice process.  One overarching right is 
the right to be “reasonably protected from the accused and any person acting 
on behalf of the accused.”154  More than a dozen other states extend to victims 
a similar constitutional right to be reasonably protected from the accused.155  
For example, a California constitutional provision extends a right to victims 
to “be reasonably protected from the defendant and persons acting on behalf 
of the defendant.”156  Federal law, too, gives victims “[t]he right to be 
reasonably protected from the accused.”157 
These kinds of provisions are designed to require that a crime victim’s 
safety be considered by courts, parole boards, and other government actors 
in making discretionary decisions that could lead to harm to a crime victim.158  
An illustration of this is the provision of a separate waiting area in a 
courthouse, where a victim might be kept separate from the defendant or the 
defendant’s family.159 
In extending a right to reasonable protection, the Amendment clarifies 
that the new right is not “intended to create a special relationship between the 
crime victim and any law enforcement agency or office.”160  The CRC’s 
drafting history underlying this clause reveals that the drafters’ intention was 
 
 154 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(3). 
 155 See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 29(3). See generally BELOOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 
257–58. 
     156 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(2). 
 157 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (2006). See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an 
Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to 
be Reasonably Protected from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 69–73 (2010) (critiquing 
this provision). 
 158 In the case of a mandatory release of an offender (e.g., releasing a defendant who has 
served the statutory maximum term of imprisonment), no such discretionary consideration 
needs to be made regarding a victim’s safety, although a victim will receive notice of the 
release. 
 159 Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n Meeting, Mar. 20, 2018 Session, vol. II at 
259–60 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://flcrc.gov/Meetings/Transcripts.html [https://perma.cc/44DG-
V7CB]. This illustration was offered as part of the provisions’ drafting history. Id. 
 160 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(3). 
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to ensure that the provision was not interpreted as requiring “around-the-
clock protection when . . . it is not warranted for victims.”161 
The Florida Amendment contains an additional provision promising 
victims the “right to have the safety and welfare of the victim and the victim’s 
family considered when setting bail, including setting pretrial release 
conditions that protect the safety and welfare of the victim and the victim’s 
family.”162  Defendants and convicted offenders who are released may pose 
a danger to their victims.  These dangers can be particularly pronounced for 
victims of domestic and sexual violence.  For instance, in November 2017 
Jason McGuire chased his estranged wife Madonna with a hammer in Cape 
Coral, Florida.163  Fearful for her safety, she filed of aggravated battery 
charges against her husband. McGuire was released on December 2, and one 
week later he killed Madonna.164 
Sadly, Madonna’s case is hardly unique.165  In an effort to prevent such 
travesties, Florida has now joined a number of other states in enacting 
constitutional provisions requiring notice to crime victims whenever an 
offender will no longer in custody.166  During criminal proceedings, before a 
sentence is imposed, the new Florida Amendment promises victims the right 
to “reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any release or escape of the 
defendant or delinquent . . . .”167 After a sentence is imposed, the 
Amendment promises victims a right to notice of “any scheduled release date 
of the offender, and the release of or the escape of the offender from 
 
 161 Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n Meeting, Mar. 20, 2018 Session, vol. II at 
259–60 (March 20, 2018), http://flcrc.gov/Meetings/Transcripts.html [https://perma.cc/44DG
-V7CB]. 
 162 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(4). 
 163 Adam Pinsker, Murder Victim Had Restraining Order Against Husband, FOX 4 NEWS, 
Dec. 18, 2017, https://www.fox4now.com/news/local-news/murder-victim-had-restraining-
order-against-husband [https://perma.cc/BJ59-J7QH]. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Jeffrey A. Cross, The Repeated Sufferings of Domestic Violence Victims Not Notified 
of Their Assailant’s Pre-Trial Release from Custody: A Call for Mandatory Domestic Violence 
Victim Notification Legislation, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 915, 915–16 (1996). 
 166 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(12); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(1). 
 167 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(a). While Florida did not have a previous constitutional 
provision regarding these rights, statutory protections did exist regarding notice of release. 
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001(1)(e) (West 2019) (requiring notice to victims of “[t]he 
release of the accused pending judicial proceedings” and “when a term of imprisonment, 
detention, or residential commitment is imposed, the release of the defendant or juvenile 
offender from such imprisonment, detention, or residential commitment”); id. § 960.001(1)(p) 
(requiring notice to victims of any escape from a state facility). 
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custody.”168  These provisions track provisions in, for example, the California 
Victims’ Rights Amendment, which gives victims the right to request to be 
informed of “the scheduled release date of the defendant, and the release of 
or the escape by the defendant from custody.”169  Other states have 
comparable notice requirements.170  These provisions ensure that victims are 
not surprised to discover that an offender is no longer in custody. 
The Florida Amendment requires notice to be provided in either of two 
circumstances: either a release, which could include a post-arrest release, the 
post-conviction paroling of a defendant, or a pardon,171 or an escape.  The 
administrative burdens associated with such notification requirements have 
been minimized by technological advances.  As with many other states, 
Florida already has in place a computer-operated program that can place a 
telephone call to a programmed number when a prisoner is moved from one 
prison to another or released.172 
The new Florida Amendment also provides a victim a right to protection 
from more than just the threat of physical violence.  For many of the same 
reasons that victims may become targets of violence because of their 
participation in the criminal justice system, they are also often the targets of 
harassment and verbal abuse.  Taking these additional forms of potential 
harm into account, the Amendment guarantees a victim the “right to be free 
from intimidation, harassment, and abuse.”173  Here again, other states have 
similar provisions.174 
 
 168 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(6)(f). 
 169 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(12). 
 170 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (Victim’s right to “be informed, upon request, 
when the accused or convicted person is released from custody or has escaped.”); MICH. 
CONST. art I, § 24(1) (Crime victims have the right “to information about the conviction, 
sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(2) 
(“[V]ictims of a crime have the right to . . . be reasonably informed when the accused or 
convicted person is arrested, released from custody, or has escaped . . . .”). 
 171 See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, Measured Mercy: Managing the Intersection 
of Executive Pardon Power and Victims’ Rights with Procedural Justice Principles, 13 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 89 (2015). 
 172 See Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Victim Services, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/vict/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XDY-MET3]. 
 173 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(2). 
 174 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(1) (Victims have a right to “be treated with 
fairness and respect for his or her privacy and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, 
harassment, and abuse, throughout the criminal or juvenile justice process.”); ILL. CONST. art. 
1, § 8.1(a)(1) (Crime victims have the right to “right to be treated with fairness and respect for 
their dignity and privacy and to be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse throughout 
the criminal justice process.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(b) (Victims shall be entitled to the 
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F. THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND DIGNITY 
Frequently victims have substantial privacy and dignity interests at 
stake in criminal proceedings.175  Sexual-assault victims, for example, suffer 
the ultimate invasion of privacy and run the risk of continued loss of privacy 
during the resulting criminal justice process.176  A criminal justice system 
should be structured so that it avoids unnecessary invasions of privacy and 
insults to a victim’s dignity.177 
Recognizing the legitimacy of protecting such victims’ interests, a 
number of states extend specific protections to crime victims’ privacy and 
dignity interests.  For example, California promises a victim a right “[t]o be 
treated with fairness and respect for his or her privacy and dignity.”178  
Arizona promises crime victims the right “[t]o be treated with fairness, 
respect, and dignity . . . throughout the criminal justice process.”179  Indiana 
extends to victims “the right to be treated with fairness, dignity and respect 
throughout the criminal justice process.”180  Federal law, too, guarantees 
crime victims “[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the 
victim’s dignity and privacy.”181 
The Florida Amendment takes a slightly different approach to 
protecting the privacy rights of victims.  Rather than enumerating any general 
right to privacy as some states do, the Amendment provides that victims have 
rights to “fairness,” “respect for the victim’s dignity,” and “to prevent the 
disclosure of information or records that could be used to locate or harass the 
victim or the victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or 
privileged information of the victim.”182  The precise scope of these rights 
remains to be fully defined,183 but existing principles and caselaw provide 
general guidance. 
 
“right to be free from intimidation, harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice 
system.”). 
 175 See generally Mary Graw Leary, The Third Dimension of Victimization, 13 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 139 (2015) (discussing digital victimization). 
 176 See Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims’ Identities, 
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1020–21 (1991). 
 177 Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power of Dignity: Dignity’s Evolution in 
the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 44–45 (2016). 
 178 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(1). 
 179 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1. 
 180 IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b). 
 181 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (2018). 
 182 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(5). 
 183 Presumably shared societal understanding of expected privacy interests will be central 
to this development. Cf. Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 
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With respect to a right to “fairness,” such provisions are usually 
understood as being analogous to a defendant’s right to due process.184  For 
example, Senator Kyl explained with regard to the federal CVRA’s fairness 
provision that “[o]f course, fairness includes the notion of due process.”185  
In Florida, interestingly, victims are promised both a right to “fairness” as 
well as a right to “due process,”186 implying that fairness must be broadly 
construed to extend beyond due process. 
A right to “dignity” has also been applied in other crime victims’ cases 
and can be applied in Florida in a case-by-case approach.  To take one 
example, a federal district court in Kansas considered whether to admit into 
the courtroom cameras and sketch artists, who might have depicted 
likenesses of mentally-ill crime victims.187  In restricting such depictions 
under the federal CVRA’s right to be treated with “dignity,” the court 
explained that “there is a compelling government interest in protecting the 
dignity, as well as the physical and psychological well-being, of mentally-ill 
alleged crime victims who have been potentially exploited through extensive 
video recording of themselves engaged in bizarre sexual behavior under the 
tutelage of their social worker.”188  Florida’s new dignity provision invites 
courts to make similar case-specific applications of the right when a victim’s 
dignity is unnecessarily threatened. 
With regard to Florida’s provision restricting disclosure of information 
that could be used to harass the victim, Florida’s police agencies have already 
begun implementing these provisions.  Because of the new Florida 
Amendment, police agencies are no longer making automatic disclosures of 
sensitive information about victims.189  And with regard to restrictions on 
releasing information that is confidential or privileged, the new Amendment 
may increase the effectiveness of protections for certain materials.  For 
example, Florida and other states have enacted sexual assault-counseling 
 
NW. U. L. REV. 141, 149–63 (2016) (discussing expectation of privacy in Fourth Amendment 
case law). 
 184 See Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note 13, at 1387 (discussing right to “fairness” 
under Utah’s victims’ rights amendment). 
 185 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 186 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(1). 
 187 United States v. Kaufman, No. CRIM.A. 04-40141-01, 2005 WL 2648070 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 17, 2005). 
 188 Id. at *4. 
 189 See Paul Cassell & Meg Garvin, Marsy’s Law is Working as Intended, Protecting 
Victims’ and the Public Interest, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2019, 
https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/marsys-law-is-working-as-intended-protecting-
victims-and-the-public-interest-20190130/ [https://perma.cc/WM7J-UCA9]. 
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privilege laws, which enable sexual assault counselors to maintain the 
confidentiality of information revealed to them by crime victims.190  
Constitutional protection for victims’ privacy may help to ensure that such 
statutes operate as intended.191 
G. THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION 
Finally, the Florida Amendment provides a right to restitution.  All 
states have recognized, at least to some degree, a crime victim’s right to 
restitution through statute,192 and about twenty states have added a state 
constitutional right to restitution.193  For example, Illinois promises to a crime 
victim “[t]he right to restitution” in its constitution.194  North Carolina 
extends to a crime victim “[t]he right [as prescribed by law] to receive 
restitution.”195  The California Constitution provides that “[r]estitution shall 
be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the 
sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.”196  
Congress has also enacted broad restitution provisions in the federal 
system.197 
The new Florida Amendment gives victims a sweeping constitutional 
right to “full and timely restitution in every case and from each convicted 
 
 190 See FLA. STAT. § 90.5035 (2002); see also 735 ILL. COMPILED STAT. ANN. 5/8-802.1 
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offender for all losses suffered, both directly and indirectly, by the victim as 
a result of the criminal conduct.”198  The drafting history of the provision 
makes clear that the intention was “to be certain that victims who have 
suffered an economic loss are made whole.”199  Against that backdrop, the 
far-reaching language in the provision promising restitution in “every case” 
makes clear that victims are always entitled to financial recovery from their 
offenders for any financial loss resulting from the crime.  Similarly, the broad 
language guaranteeing “full” restitution for “all losses suffered, both directly 
and indirectly” makes clear that victims are entitled to restitution for all 
aspects of any loss.  For example, not only are victims entitled to recover the 
fair market value of any property they may have lost, but if incremental value 
existed—such as sentimental value—then restitution is required for that 
value as well.200  Finally, the inclusion of a timeliness requirement provides 
an opportunity for victims to demand restitution as soon as it becomes 
reasonably available. 
The Florida Amendment’s language also is clearer than some other 
restitution laws on how restitution is to be paid in situations where a victim 
suffers a loss caused by multiple criminals.  The right to restitution “from 
each convicted offender for all losses suffered” means that a victim need not 
apportion her restitution among multiple defendants.201  Some other 
restitution regimes have had difficulty providing full restitution to victims in 
these situations, such as child-pornography possession crimes, when many 
widely distributed offenders are together responsible for the victim’s 
losses.202  The Florida Amendment, however, takes the simple step of clearly 
making any convicted defendant jointly and severally liable for all of a 
victim’s losses—a standard approach in tort law that applies equally well to 
criminal restitution awards.203 
 
 198 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(9). 
 199 See Transcript, Fla. Const. Revision Comm’n, Mar. 20, 2018 Session, vol. II at 260–
61 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://flcrc.gov/Meetings/Transcripts.html [https://perma.cc/44DG-V7C
B]. 
 200 See Davis v. State, 244 So.3d 374, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that 
restitution can go beyond fair market value to include such things as “sentimental value” or 
the value of “recent repairs”). 
 201 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i) (2018) (allowing apportionment of restitution among multiple 
defendants). 
 202 See, e.g., Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (reversing order for full 
restitution to child pornography victim and ordering only proportional restitution). 
 203 See generally Paul G. Cassell et al., The Case for Full Restitution for Child 
Pornography Victims, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 97–109 (2013) (arguing child pornography 
victims are entitled to restitution for the full amount of their losses from defendants who have 
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Even though this restitution provision is broad, offenders may often lack 
the means to make full restitution.  Accordingly, even in the face of a full 
restitution requirement, a sentencing judge can establish an appropriate 
repayment schedule and enforce it during the period in which the offender is 
under the court’s jurisdiction.204  It is important to understand that victims’ 
interests and defendants’ interests can sometimes align on restitution.  A 
defendant who pays restitution may be able to raise a well-deserved claim for 
mitigation of other penalties, perhaps gaining a shorter term of imprisonment 
or perhaps even no imprisonment at all so that he can continue to work and 
make restitution payments to victims.205  Notably, a defendant who cannot 
pay the full amount of restitution ordered is put on a payment plan to pay 
only as much as they can reasonably afford.206  As with many other issues, 
the trial court can exercise its sound discretion in implementing restitution, 
provided that the victim’s right to full restitution is protected. 
H. THE “VICTIM” DEFINITION PROVISION 
In addition to extending rights to crime victims, the new Florida 
Amendment provides a definition of a “victim” to whom the rights are 
extended.207  This definition is important, as otherwise victims’ rights would 
be remitted to the discretion of either the courts or the legislature in deciding 
who would be afforded rights. 
The Amendment provides that “[a]s used in this section, a ‘victim’ is a 
person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial 
harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or 
delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is committed.”208  
This “victim” definition is a standard one, having been used elsewhere, such 
 
 204 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f) (2018) (establishing restitution procedures for payment 
schedules). 
 205 Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards A Theory of Mitigation, 96 
B.U. L. REV. 161, 194 (2016) (reporting survey finding “strong agreement among judges that 
victim compensation could be mitigating”); see also Benji McMurray, The Mitigating Power 
of a Victim Focus at Sentencing, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 125 (2006). But cf. Mark Osler, Must 
Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the False Trial of Uniformity and Process, and 
the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 649, 673 (2003) (arguing that “the victim’s rights 
movement further imperils the traditional goals of sentencing in that it tends, by its nature, to 
serve only the goal of retribution”). 
 206 See, e.g., Bourget v. State, 634 So.2d 1109, 1110 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he 
trial court cannot revoke [a defendant’s] probation for an inability to pay if she makes a bona 
fide effort to obtain the necessary resources.”). 
 207 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(e). 
 208 Id. 
132 CASSELL & GARVIN [Vol. 110 
as California’s constitutional provisions.209  Its application in most cases 
should be straightforward, since for many crimes Florida prosecutors must 
identify a specific victim.210  In situations where “victim” status is in doubt, 
the trial court can inquire into the circumstances of the case and see where a 
person claiming victims status has suffered “direct or threatened physical, 
psychological, or financial harm.” 
In some cases, the victim will be unable to personally exercise their 
rights.  In such cases, the Florida Amendment provides that the “term 
‘victim’ includes the victim’s lawful representative, the parent or guardian of 
a minor, or the next of kin of a homicide victim, except upon a showing that 
the interest of such individual would be in actual or potential conflict with 
the interests of the victim.”211  Thus, in situations where the victim is a minor, 
is incapacitated, or deceased (as in a homicide case), the victim’s 
“representative” can step into the victim’s shoes to assert the victim’s rights. 
The Amendment makes clear that “[t]he term ‘victim’ does not include 
the accused.”212  This provision ensures that someone who is criminally 
culpable cannot attempt to take advantage of victims’ enactments, as has 
occasionally been attempted in other states.213  Also, to ensure that crime 
victims who are harmed by juveniles are covered by the Amendment’s 
provisions, the Amendment specifies that its protections extend not just to 
crimes by adults but also “delinquent acts and conduct.” 214 
I. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
In addition to extending the substantive rights discussed above, the 
Amendment also contains various enforcement provisions designed to 
guarantee that the rights will work effectively.  In addition to enumerating 
rights, Florida’s Amendment clarifies that the rights included “may not be 
construed to deny or impair any other rights possessed by victims.”215  
Further, that provision also declares that the Amendment is self-executing 
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and does not “require implementing legislation.”216  This provision gives the 
Amendment’s new rights automatic legal effect without the need for any 
subsequent action by the Florida Legislature.  Of course, the fact that 
accompanying legislation is not required does not mean it is not permitted.  
Legislation has been proposed in Florida to aid in the implementation of the 
victims’ rights enumerated in the new constitutional language—although 
such legislation has yet to be enacted.217 
The Amendment also guarantees that victims will receive information 
about their rights.  The Amendment extends to victims the “right to be 
informed of these rights . . . .  This information shall be made available to the 
general public and provided to all crime victims in the form of a card or by 
other means intended to effectively advise the victim of their rights under 
this section.”218  This provision already exists in many other states that have 
adopted Marsy’s Laws, including California.219  Presumably, the information 
will be provided through a Marsy’s Law card, which law enforcement 
officers can provide to victims when they contact them after the crime.220 
Once victims receive information about their rights under the 
Amendment, the Amendment also ensures that they are empowered to assert 
and seek enforcement of their rights.  Responding to enforcement problems 
with earlier victims’ protections,221 the new Amendment specifically 
authorizes victims, attorneys retained by victims, lawful representatives of 
victims, and prosecutors acting upon the request of victims to “assert and 
seek enforcement of the rights enumerated in th[e] section . . . as a matter of 
right.”222  This provision guarantees victims—and those representing a 
victim’s interests—“standing”223 to assert victims’ rights in any case where 
those rights are implicated. 
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The Amendment further requires that courts and other authorities with 
jurisdiction over a case to enforce the rights of victims whenever victims 
assert them.  Specifically, the Amendment requires that authorities “shall act 
promptly on such a request [for enforcement of a victim’s right], affording a 
remedy by due course of law . . . .”224  Further, the Amendment requires 
victims receive an adequate explanation for the authority’s decision by 
mandating the authority “clearly stat[e] on the record” the reasons for its 
disposition of the victim’s asserted right.225  These provisions, similar to 
those found in other victims’ enactments,226 should provide victims the 
power to directly and quickly secure enforcement of their rights in the 
circumstances where government authorities fail to provide them.227 
III. LESSONS FROM FLORIDA’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR 
VICTIMS 
Having reviewed how Florida’s new constitutional provisions were 
designed to operate, can we learn any broader lessons about protecting crime 
victims’ rights in state constitutions and, more broadly, about state 
constitutions in general?  Four lessons seem particularly important. 
A first lesson to be drawn from the new Florida amendment is that a 
consensus is emerging regarding the kind of rights to which crime victims 
are entitled.  Marsy’s Law supporters were proud to report after the 
November 2018 election that an additional 52 million Americans were 
covered by Marsy’s Law provisions228—and that figure did not account for 
the population of other states, including California, which had previously 
approved strong state constitutional victims’ rights amendments. 
Very little language in the Florida Amendment is unprecedented or 
untested.229  To the contrary, almost all the provisions parallel other state 
constitutional provisions (or the federal CVRA).  This conjunction of 
language may provide support for Professor Paul Kahn’s suggestion that the 
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interpretation of state constitutions ultimately reflects common principles 
leading to an “American constitutionalism.”230  While the extent of such state 
constitutional convergence has been disputed,231 the developing convergence 
on crime victims’ rights should reassure legislators, courts, and others 
involved in the criminal justice system that victims’ rights can be 
successfully grafted on to existing processes.  And, more broadly, perhaps 
the emerging consensus and convergence of these victims’ rights enactments 
will demarcate a set of widely shared values around the country.232 
The second lesson that emerges is that extensive rights can be crafted to 
provide rights to victims that do not undercut other interests.  Comparing 
Florida’s original 1988 victims’ rights amendment to the 2018 version 
reveals a dramatic difference.  In 1988, Florida moved quite cautiously, 
promising crime victims just three rights—the rights to be informed, present, 
and heard (when relevant)—at “crucial” proceedings.233 
The country now knows much more about the kinds of victims’ rights 
that need to be protected—and can be protected—than it did several decades 
ago.  Florida’s new Amendment promises victims a lengthy set of rights, 
including both specific and general rights.  The new Amendment attempts to 
cover the full extent of potential issues confronting crime victims during the 
criminal justice process, addressing everything from victims’ rights during 
initial bail hearings, plea discussions and plea hearing, to trials, sentencings, 
and parole and commutation proceedings.  The new Amendment addresses 
all aspects of the criminal process. 
Victims are becoming part of the day-to-day landscape of criminal 
cases.  Too often in the past, crime victims were viewed as the “barbarians at 
the gate”234—an unworthy group seeking to destroy the criminal justice 
system rather than improve it.  But the idea that crime victims’ rights should 
not be a part of a conventional criminal justice system is becoming 
increasingly difficult to maintain, as Florida and many other states enact 
expansive victims’ rights amendments responsive to community needs. 
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Florida’s experience in expanding constitutional protections for victims 
may set an example for other states.  About a dozen states lack any state 
constitutional protections for crime victims.235  Florida’s decision to enlarge 
previously existing victims’ rights might signal to these states the importance 
of adding state constitutional rights for victims. 
For the more than two-thirds of states that have already enacted victims’ 
rights amendments, Florida’s recent amendment might also serve as a 
model—particularly for those states with antiquated provisions.  Just as 
Florida’s amendment required updating, other states might consider whether 
their amendments need modernization.  For any state lacking comprehensive 
constitutional protection of victims’ interests, Florida’s new progressive 
provisions can provide guidance. 
A third lesson evident from the new Florida Amendment is the 
importance of providing “standing” and other enforcement mechanisms in 
crime victims protections.  In 1988, Florida adopted a few baseline rights for 
crime victims.236  But as noted earlier,237 an inability to enforce those basic 
provisions led to an incomplete implementation of the rights.  If states are 
going to promise crime victims rights in the criminal justice process, victims 
need “standing” to assert their rights, as otherwise the victims’ rights are 
rendered meaningless. 
Using language found in constitutional amendments in other states, 
Florida now provides victims standing through a specific constitutional right 
to assert their rights,238 ensuring that courts and other institutions cannot 
simply ignore victims’ interests.  Perhaps even more important, the Florida 
Amendment also requires that the courts “shall act promptly on such a 
request, affording a remedy by due course of law for the violation of any 
right.”239  These specific enforcement measures should make victims’ rights 
in Florida not just a set of paper promises, but realities in the criminal justice 
system. 
Clear and simple directions to enforce crime victims’ rights are 
especially necessary because of the unfortunate reality that victims often 
 
 235 See State Victim Right Amendments, Nat’l Victims’ Const. Amend. Passage, (2012), 
http://www.nvcap.org/states/stvras.html [https://perma.cc/FQ93-XT53] (collecting states 
with and without victims’ rights amendments). 
 236 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (1988); supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 237 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 238 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(c) (the victim “may assert and seek enforcement of the rights 
enumerated in this section . . . in any trial or appellate court . . . .”). 
 239 Id. 
2020]  PROTECTING CRIME VICTIMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 137 
need to assert their rights without the assistance of legal counsel.240  The 
procedural mechanisms for enforcing victims’ rights should be laid out as 
clearly and simply as possible so that even victims without legal counsel 
know how to proceed. 
By providing specific enforcement mechanisms, Florida’s Amendment 
fits within a broader pattern of recent “self-executing” state constitutional 
amendments.  Self-executing constitutional provisions are those that take full 
effect without the need for any further legislative action.241  As discussed 
above,242 the new Florida Amendment directly provides that its provisions 
“are self-executing, and do not require implementing legislation.”243  
Florida’s specific language may signal that crime victims’ rights protections 
are, like some other recently enacted state constitutional protections, “a 
modern fundamental right deserving of constitutional stature and insulation 
from the whims of courts and the legislature.”244 
Fourth and finally, Florida crime victims now have broad and 
overarching rights to “due process,” “fairness,” and “respect for the victim’s 
dignity.”245  These capacious rights should significantly advance the attention 
that courts and other institutions pay to victims’ interests in the criminal 
justice process. Just as the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s used 
“due process” language in the Fourteenth Amendment to significantly 
expand criminal defendants’ rights,246 it is possible that Florida (and other 
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states) courts will use similarly broad language in crime victims’ 
amendments to ensure that crime victims’ concerns are not overlooked. 
Many commentators have urged state courts to begin paying renewed 
attention to state constitutional provisions, including exploring the full reach 
of state due process clauses and other similarly broadly worded rights.  For 
example, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton recently published 
an excellent book, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of 
American Constitutional Law, explaining how state constitutions are 
designed to be “change incubators,” developing new ways to protect 
individual rights in an increasingly complex world.247  By interpreting their 
state constitutional provisions, state courts can develop innovative rights, 
perhaps ultimately exporting ideas that work in one state to other states and 
federal government.248  Judge Sutton is hardly alone in calling attention to 
the role of state constitutions in protecting important rights in this country.  
At least since Justice William J. Brennan’s influential 1986 article on how 
state constitutions can serve as guardians of individual rights,249 many state 
courts and legal commentators have echoed this position.250  The protections 
for crime victims now found in Florida and other states’ constitutions provide 
the perfect opportunity for such development. 
As Florida and other states move on to the next chapter in their efforts 
to protect crime victims’ rights, this incubation of rights may result in further 
attention to how best to protect crime victims in the criminal justice process.  
Florida’s experience with its clear and comprehensive victims’ rights 
Amendment may well inform a national conversation recognizing crime 
victims’ rights as worthy of protection in our nation’s fundamental charter—
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perhaps leading to a federal constitutional amendment providing the highest 
level of constitutional protection for all crime victims across the country. 
